Executive control in the external sense refers
to the control exercised by the political executive
over the permanent executive or bureaucracy.
There are various ways in which political control
over bureaucracy manifests itself viz. policy
making, budgetary system, personnel
management, delegated legislation, ordinances,
civil service codes, etc. Some are discussed below:
Political Direction (Policy-making): In
India, the Cabinet formulates administrative
policies and enjoys the power of direction,
supervision and coordination with regard to its
implementation. The minister, who is in-charge of one or more departments, lays down the
departmental policy and directs, supervises and
coordinates its implementation by the
administrators. Thus, though political direction,
the Minister controls the operations of
administrative agencies working under his
ministry/department(s). The departmental
officials are directly and totally responsible to the
minister. In the USA, the same function is
performed by the President and his secretaries.
Budgetary System: The executive controls the
administration through budgetary system. It
formulates the budget, gets it enacted by the
Parliament, and allocates the necessary funds to
the administrative agencies to meet their
expenditure. In all such activities, the Ministry
of Finance (which is the central financial agency
of the Government of India) plays an important
role. It exercises financial control over
administration in the following ways.
(i) Approval of policies and programmes
in principle.
(ii) Acceptance of provision in the budget
estimates.
(iii) Sanctioning expenditure.
(iv) Providing financial advice trough the
Integrated Financial Advisor.
(v) Reappropriation of grants (i.e., transfer
for funds from one sub-head to another).
(vi) Internal audit system.
(vii) Prescribing a financial code to be
followed by the spending authorities.
Appointment and Removal (Personnel
Management and Control): This is the most
effective means of executive control over
administration. The executive plays as important
role in personnel management and control and
enjoys the power of appointment and removal
of top administrators. In this function, the
executive (in India) is assisted by the Department
of Personnel and Training, the Ministry of
Finance, and the UPSC. The Department of
Personnel and Training is the central personnel
agency in India and plays a major role in
personnel management and control. At the
highest level, the ministers play an important role
in the selection and appointment of secretaries
and heads of departments. Thus they (i.e.,
ministers) exercise full control over the
administration of departments under their
charge through such appointees.
In the USA also, though the President has to
seek the approval of Senate for effecting
appointments to top posts, he has the exclusive power of removing them from office. The Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) in the US
plays an important role in personnel
management and control.
Delegated Legislation: Also known as the
executive legislation, it is an important tool in
the hands of the executive to exercise control over
administration. The Parliament makes laws in
skeleton forms and authorizes the executive to
fill in minor detail. Therefore, the executive
makes rules, regulations and by-laws which
have to be observed by the administrators in
execution of the law concerned.
Ordinances: The Constitution of India
authorizes the chief executive, that is, the
President to promulgate ordinances during the
recess (interval) of Parliament to meet situation
demanding immediate action. An ordinance is
as authoritative and powerful as an act of
Parliament and hence, governs the functioning
of administration
Civil Service Code: The executive has
prescribed a civil service code to be observed and
followed by the administrators in the exercise of
their official powers. It consists of a set of conduct
rules which prevent the administrators from
misutilising their powers for personal ends. The
important among such rules in India are as
follows.
(a) All-India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954
(b) Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,
1955
(c) Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1956
The deal with various thing like loyalty to
the state, obeying the official ordes of the
superiors, political activities of civil servants,
financial transactions of civil servants, marital
restrictions, and others
Staff Agencies: The executive also exercise
control over administration through staff
agencies. The important staff agencies in India
are the Department of Administrative Reforms,
the Planning Commission, the Cabinet
Secretariat and the Prime Minister’s Office.
Mooney said that a staff agency is “an expansion
of the personality of the executive. It means more
eyes, more eyes, more ears and more hands to
aid him in forming and carrying out his plans.”
Thus, the staff agencies exercise influence and
indirect control over the administrative agencies
and play an important role in coordinating their
policies and programmes.
Appeal to Public Opinion: The
administrative system, (i.e., civil services or
bureaucracy) whether in the USA or the UK or
India, is status quo oriented and hence resists
change. It does not receive new policies, plans,
programmes and projects formulated by the
executive with positive mindedness. In fact, the
various organs of the administrative machinery,
in the words of pfiffner and Presthus, “seek to
strengthen their position vis-á-vis other agencies,
and the executive, by alliances with legislature
and pressure groups, as well as by calculated
support building campaigns directed at the
general public. They develop vested interests not
only in programme areas, but equally in
established ways of doing things, which enhance
the self-consciousness and strategic position of
the bureaucracy.” Due to this, the bureaucracy
resists new programmes and methods as they
threaten its (bureaucracy’s) strong position.
Under such circumstances, the executive appeals
to the public opinion.
However the major issue in this section
remains the complexity of minister-civil servant
relationship wherein we have to examine as to
what is the environment in which the two of
them function and what are the guiding factors
which shape the relationship and what should
be the ideal course in which such relationship
should move. The issue culminates into the
argument between Neutral bureaucracy vs
Committed bureaucracy or ‘politicized’
bureaucracy.
Herein we discuss the core issue of
accountability and control (i.e., how to ensure
that the bureaucracy operates with legality,
efficiency and effectiveness while its operational
autonomy and morale is not curbed excessively
under the influence of controls) in the light of
political influences which are an essential feature
of administrative bureaucracy. The political
environment under which the bureaucracy
functions both helps and curtails its freedom.
Political control of bureaucracy makes it immune
to direct public scrutiny as the bureaucracy
functions under ministerial responsibility and
remains anonymous behind the political
executive. However this very anonymity
sometimes comes at the expense of political
neutrality which frequently comes under
pressure and the bureaucrats start serving the
political party in power rather than the
constitution for which they had sworned.
Compromise on political neutrality brings in the
casualty of another cherished bureaucratic value
of impartiality. Thus the trinity of political
neutrality, anonymity and impartiality which
makes bureaucracy the useful machine it is gets
jeopardized under the influence of political
influence. So whether bureaucracy should be
made a totally autonomous institution free from
any political control? The answer is no, because
such an unanswerable disposition would
unleash the evil of absolutism sleeping within
the bureaucracy.
Thus another issue within the complicated
issue of minister-civil servant relationship is as
to how to preserve the proverbial neutrality,
anonymity and impartiality of the bureaucracy
while operating under the influence of the
political executive or how to keep the
bureaucracy efficient and effective despite the
wavering political environment in which it
functions.
The first step to examine the minister-civil
servant relationship is to identify the factors
which determine the nature of relationship
between minister and civil servant.
The conventional view of public
administration is based upon the dichotomy of
politics and administration i.e., administration
and politics should be kept separate. Politics or
policy making is the proper activity of the
legislative bodies and administration is the
proper activity of administrators who carry out
policies. It is opposed to any political role of the
civil servants. It visualizes the relationship
between the administrator and the politician in
terms of a neat division of labor – the politician
formulates the policy and the administrator
executes it. The bureaucrat acts as pure advisor
to his political master, presents facts of the case,
suggests lines of action and implications of
alternative policies. It is the prerogative of the
political master to decide the policy. The
bureaucrat is expected to implement the policy
faithfully, whatever the decision. He is to be
anonymous and neutral in the discharge of his
duty. He is expected to render impartial advice
without fear or favor. The doctrine of neutrality
and anonymity has been one of the fundamental
tenets of the Weberian bureaucracy.
The planners in India too subscribed to the
Weberian ideal of neutral civil service. An
impersonal, strictly rule-bound, neutral
bureaucracy was expected not only to provide
the necessary administrative objectivity but also enhance the democratic principle of equality and
provide protection from arbitrary rule by
adhering to the concept of neutrality. The
traditional concept of neutrality, however, has
been challenged on many grounds. The earlier
concept of separation of politics and
administration in watertight compartments is
considered no more valid. The role of the Civil
Service has been changing from being a mere
agent of the political executive to that of
collaboration with it. The involvement of
bureaucracy in political arena is now widely
prevalent
This breakdown of the theory of neutrality has
come about because of a number of reasons:
1. The processes of policy making are no
longer confined to the political executive.
The truth is that the bureaucrats play an
important role in policy formulation,
perceived to be the exclusive preserve of
elected politicians. This has happened
because the statutes passed by the
parliament are not clear enough. The
legislative behavior follows no consistent
pattern. Whereas, some measures are too
detailed, some only identify the problem. The
minister is rarely an expert in the work of
his department or the techniques of public
administration. He merely has general ideas
in line with the political ideology of his
party, but he often is not sure as to what is
the best solution to a particular problem. He
is therefore, forced to rely on his permanent
staff for facts and advice. In effect then, it is
the Administrator who has the major role
in framing the policy.
2. The decline of neutrality can be attributed
to the demands and pressures of coalition
politics. In coalition governments, ministers
are busy in the power game and
maneuvering for their survival, and have
neither time nor inclination to guide, direct
and control their department or
bureaucracy. Also at times, the legislative
process is so stormy and full of diverse
views that a statute passed incorporates a
number of contradictory policy guidelines.
The necessity of reaching a compromise
solution to hold the coalition together leads
the legislators to use vague language and
the administrator has to use his own
judgment to interpret the policy. Therefore,
bureaucracy has clearly made inroads in
policy making and despite the regulations
governing the civil servants they have been
politicized considerably.
3. According to some political commentators,
the classical theory of civil service neutrality
presupposes agreement on principles
fundamental to democracy. In other words,
neutral, value-free bureaucracy is possible
only in a society where consensus exists
on values; but in transitional societies like
India, where dissent and conflict exist; it is
too much to expect anyone to be neutral.
4. Especially for a developing country like
India where speedy socio-economic
development has to be steadily pushed
through, the nature and character of
bureaucracy assumes special significance.
The involvement of civil servants in
numerous decisions be it the location of a
steel plant or a school building in a village,
makes them partners in development along
with the politicians. Their value preferences
get inextricably mixed up with technical
advice. In the context of large-scale welfare
programs therefore, absolute neutrality is
not practically possible.
Thus the idea of committed bureaucracy
comes into picture which stands for a certain
commitment to the goals and objectives of the
state. Moreover, neutrality cannot be allowed to
degenerate into disinterestedness. The successful
carrying out of developmental tasks requires on
the part of administrators not only qualities of
initiative and leadership but also a sense of
emotional integration with the policies and
programs and identification with the interests
of the common man. Thus the idea of
bureaucracy as a neutral instrument in the
conduct of public affairs stood refuted as the
concept of politics-administration dichotomy.
The concept of ‘committed bureaucracy’ was
however much contested in the political and
administrative circles. It was alleged that it would
degenerate into what is called as ‘politicized
bureaucracy’ i.e., it would destroy the character
of the neutral bureaucracy and would create a
breed of pliable civil servants who would always
say “Yes Minister” and would be ready to crawl
when asked to bend by their political masters.
In practice however those fears of the critics have
come to life, commitment has indeed assumed
the perverted form of politicization and sycophancy. Very often it is seen that
bureaucracy simply acts according to the dictates
of the political executive without any
independent examination of issues.
This trend of excessive politicization of
bureaucracy can be attributed to the evergrowing
political interference in the affairs of
administration. Political interference and
committed/neutral administration cannot coexist.
While the administrators do not perceive
their role in policy making as subservient to the
political leaders because of their knowledge and
expertise, yet they have to conform to the
prerequisites of representative politics. The
political leaders claim to be the true
representatives of the people and thus claim to
know the values of the people. Because of their
superior position they succeed in dictating the
terms to the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats who
are not obliging enough soon find themselves in
trouble. The political masters have many means
of coercion–both overt and covert. Political
interference in all matters including those where
the statutory power is vested in the civil servants
is a constant phenomenon. There are numerous
instances of use of transfers, promotion,
supersession and compulsory retirement from
service by elected politicians as tools to silence
the voice of dissent and expression of difference
of opinion.
Moreover, politicization works the other way
round also. Many administrators use political
influence or forge alliance with the politician to
brighten their own career prospects. They take
advantage of the amateur politician; exploit his
weakness particularly in times of a fluid political
situation and turn out to be autonomous and
irresponsible. This is an equally grim scenario.
What emerges out of the analysis is that
whether there is collision or collusion between
the political executive and the bureaucracy, in
both cases it leads to organizational imbalance
and ultimately the governance suffers.
Commission’s Views
Expressing concern over the deteriorating
administrative standards, the government
appointed the Administrative Reforms
Commission (ARC) in 1966 to conduct a
comprehensive study of the administrative
system and suggest remedies. The two most
important areas touched upon by the ARC in its
reports were: (a) Minister – Civil ServantsChronicle IAS Academy [8]
relationship, wherein the ARC emphasized the
need for the de-politicization of the services, and
(b) the creation of a climate and culture of
administration that would help assert the
growth of healthy personal relationship between
Civil Servants and Minister. The ARC took
cognizance of the fact that proper relationship
between the political executive and bureaucracy
is a matter of highest importance to the
administrative performance of government. It
observed that the existing pattern of relationship
was different from what was envisaged. More
and more cases of deviation were coming to
notice. For instance the extent of bureaucratic
involvement in politics was exceptionally high,
there was frequent use of transfers and postings
to manipulate bureaucracy, there was unholy
nexus between politicians and bureaucracy, etc.
which was taking its toll on administrative
efficiency.
Therefore, corrective measures were required
to restore the health of the system.
The ARC stressed on the urgency to prevent
bureaucracy’s aggressive role in politics and also
on the need to check arbitrary interference of
politicians in administrative affairs. It believed
that both Minister and Civil Servants must
appreciate rather than belittle each others’ work
and attempt maximum accommodation of one
another’s views. On the part of the political
executive there should be, in the words of the
ARC,
A. Proper understanding of the administrative
functions and recognition of its
professional nature.
B. Little interference as possible in service
matters, e.g. postings, transfers, promotions,
etc.
C. No requests for departures from declared
and approved policies to suit individual
cases.
Similarly, on the part of the civil service it
asserts:
A. There must be a sincere and honest attempt
to find out what the political head wants
and make the necessary adjustment in
policies and procedures to suit his wishes.
B. Readiness to fall in line with his political
chief in all matters, unless strong grounds
indicate a different course.
In other words, it means an emotional and
mental acceptance by the bureaucracy of the ideology of the government policy to be executed
by it.
Despite the valuable recommendations made
by the ARC to streamline the relationship
between the minister and the civil servants,
nothing much seems to have changed because
of political and administrative apathy. Making
the matters worse is the growth in recent times
of a nexus between the politicians, criminals,
police and the civil servants rooted in the
considerations of “mutuality of benefit”. An
increasing use of money and muscle power by
political parties in winning elections is of
common knowledge. Since the muscle power is
mostly provided by the mafia and the criminals,
a close nexus prevails between the politicians
and the criminals resulting in “criminalization
of politics”. This has been the main conclusion
of the Vohra Committee Report of 1993
submitted by the then Home Secretary, Mr. N.N.
Vohra which was set up to look into the
criminalization of politics. The report observed
that the mafia and the criminals enjoyed the
patronage of politicians and the protection of
government functionaries. It pointed out how
the nexus was virtually running a parallel
government, pushing the state apparatus into
irrelevance. Here the two elites – political and
administrative, join hands and become not only
thick friends but also grand thieves. Such a nexus
is detrimental to public interest. Therefore, it was
felt that corrective steps must be taken to ensure
that this evil nexus is curbed.
With this objective in mind, the Prime
Minister inaugurated a Conference of Chief
Secretaries in November 1996 on ‘An Agenda
for an Effective and Responsive Administration.
The Conference emphasized the need for
bringing about transformation in public services
so as to make them more effective, clean,
accountable and citizen friendly. The Conference
also highlighted the necessity of adopting the
code of ethics for public services which not only
regulates the role of the civil servants but also
specifies the relationship between the employees
in public services and politicians, so that the basic
commitment of the civil servants towards the
welfare of the public and the principles
enshrined in the Constitution is reiterated.
Further, the 2nd ARC in its report on
Personnel administration emphasized on a need
to safeguard the political neutrality andChronicle IAS Academy [9]
impartiality of the civil services for which it
believes that the onus lies equally on the political
executive as well as the civil service
This aspect is recommended to be included
in the Code of Ethics for Ministers as well as the
Code of Conduct for Public Servants. Further the
Commission reiterated its recommendation
made in its Report on “Ethics in Governance”
while examining the definition of corruption
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
wherein it has been recommended that “abuse
of authority unduly favoring or harming
someone” and “obstruction of justice” should be
classified as an offence under the Act. This would
lead to the protection of honest and upright civil
servants against arbitrary political interference.
Moreover it also stressed upon the essentiality
to lay down certain norms for recruitment in
government to avoid complaints of favoritism,
nepotism, corruption and abuse of power. These
norms are:
i) Well defined procedure for recruitment
to all government jobs.
ii) Wide publicity and open competition for
recruitment to all posts.
iii) Minimization, if not elimination, of
discretion in the recruitment process.
iv) Selection primarily on the basis of
written examination or on the basis of
performance in existing public/board/
university examination with minimum
weight to interview.
These principles are envisaged in the new
Civil Services Bill which the commission has
suggested the government to bring.
Having said all this the real fruits of the efforts
can come only if the government implements
these recommendations which is in itself is an
issue of concern as any such move is interpreted
in the political circles as a move to dilute political
control over administration which is a taboo in
the political class of India. Further beyond the
limitations of organization and structures there
have been numerous instances of upright civil
servants driven by morals that have resisted all
the attempts of politicization and held their
ground defying fears of manipulation by
transfers, promotions, postings, etc. So
ultimately structures and statutes could only help
up to a limited extent and primarily it is the men
of conscience who could really help in bringing
good governance to the people.
to the control exercised by the political executive
over the permanent executive or bureaucracy.
There are various ways in which political control
over bureaucracy manifests itself viz. policy
making, budgetary system, personnel
management, delegated legislation, ordinances,
civil service codes, etc. Some are discussed below:
Political Direction (Policy-making): In
India, the Cabinet formulates administrative
policies and enjoys the power of direction,
supervision and coordination with regard to its
implementation. The minister, who is in-charge of one or more departments, lays down the
departmental policy and directs, supervises and
coordinates its implementation by the
administrators. Thus, though political direction,
the Minister controls the operations of
administrative agencies working under his
ministry/department(s). The departmental
officials are directly and totally responsible to the
minister. In the USA, the same function is
performed by the President and his secretaries.
Budgetary System: The executive controls the
administration through budgetary system. It
formulates the budget, gets it enacted by the
Parliament, and allocates the necessary funds to
the administrative agencies to meet their
expenditure. In all such activities, the Ministry
of Finance (which is the central financial agency
of the Government of India) plays an important
role. It exercises financial control over
administration in the following ways.
(i) Approval of policies and programmes
in principle.
(ii) Acceptance of provision in the budget
estimates.
(iii) Sanctioning expenditure.
(iv) Providing financial advice trough the
Integrated Financial Advisor.
(v) Reappropriation of grants (i.e., transfer
for funds from one sub-head to another).
(vi) Internal audit system.
(vii) Prescribing a financial code to be
followed by the spending authorities.
Appointment and Removal (Personnel
Management and Control): This is the most
effective means of executive control over
administration. The executive plays as important
role in personnel management and control and
enjoys the power of appointment and removal
of top administrators. In this function, the
executive (in India) is assisted by the Department
of Personnel and Training, the Ministry of
Finance, and the UPSC. The Department of
Personnel and Training is the central personnel
agency in India and plays a major role in
personnel management and control. At the
highest level, the ministers play an important role
in the selection and appointment of secretaries
and heads of departments. Thus they (i.e.,
ministers) exercise full control over the
administration of departments under their
charge through such appointees.
In the USA also, though the President has to
seek the approval of Senate for effecting
appointments to top posts, he has the exclusive power of removing them from office. The Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) in the US
plays an important role in personnel
management and control.
Delegated Legislation: Also known as the
executive legislation, it is an important tool in
the hands of the executive to exercise control over
administration. The Parliament makes laws in
skeleton forms and authorizes the executive to
fill in minor detail. Therefore, the executive
makes rules, regulations and by-laws which
have to be observed by the administrators in
execution of the law concerned.
Ordinances: The Constitution of India
authorizes the chief executive, that is, the
President to promulgate ordinances during the
recess (interval) of Parliament to meet situation
demanding immediate action. An ordinance is
as authoritative and powerful as an act of
Parliament and hence, governs the functioning
of administration
Civil Service Code: The executive has
prescribed a civil service code to be observed and
followed by the administrators in the exercise of
their official powers. It consists of a set of conduct
rules which prevent the administrators from
misutilising their powers for personal ends. The
important among such rules in India are as
follows.
(a) All-India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1954
(b) Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules,
1955
(c) Railway Services (Conduct) Rules, 1956
The deal with various thing like loyalty to
the state, obeying the official ordes of the
superiors, political activities of civil servants,
financial transactions of civil servants, marital
restrictions, and others
Staff Agencies: The executive also exercise
control over administration through staff
agencies. The important staff agencies in India
are the Department of Administrative Reforms,
the Planning Commission, the Cabinet
Secretariat and the Prime Minister’s Office.
Mooney said that a staff agency is “an expansion
of the personality of the executive. It means more
eyes, more eyes, more ears and more hands to
aid him in forming and carrying out his plans.”
Thus, the staff agencies exercise influence and
indirect control over the administrative agencies
and play an important role in coordinating their
policies and programmes.
Appeal to Public Opinion: The
administrative system, (i.e., civil services or
bureaucracy) whether in the USA or the UK or
India, is status quo oriented and hence resists
change. It does not receive new policies, plans,
programmes and projects formulated by the
executive with positive mindedness. In fact, the
various organs of the administrative machinery,
in the words of pfiffner and Presthus, “seek to
strengthen their position vis-á-vis other agencies,
and the executive, by alliances with legislature
and pressure groups, as well as by calculated
support building campaigns directed at the
general public. They develop vested interests not
only in programme areas, but equally in
established ways of doing things, which enhance
the self-consciousness and strategic position of
the bureaucracy.” Due to this, the bureaucracy
resists new programmes and methods as they
threaten its (bureaucracy’s) strong position.
Under such circumstances, the executive appeals
to the public opinion.
However the major issue in this section
remains the complexity of minister-civil servant
relationship wherein we have to examine as to
what is the environment in which the two of
them function and what are the guiding factors
which shape the relationship and what should
be the ideal course in which such relationship
should move. The issue culminates into the
argument between Neutral bureaucracy vs
Committed bureaucracy or ‘politicized’
bureaucracy.
Herein we discuss the core issue of
accountability and control (i.e., how to ensure
that the bureaucracy operates with legality,
efficiency and effectiveness while its operational
autonomy and morale is not curbed excessively
under the influence of controls) in the light of
political influences which are an essential feature
of administrative bureaucracy. The political
environment under which the bureaucracy
functions both helps and curtails its freedom.
Political control of bureaucracy makes it immune
to direct public scrutiny as the bureaucracy
functions under ministerial responsibility and
remains anonymous behind the political
executive. However this very anonymity
sometimes comes at the expense of political
neutrality which frequently comes under
pressure and the bureaucrats start serving the
political party in power rather than the
constitution for which they had sworned.
Compromise on political neutrality brings in the
casualty of another cherished bureaucratic value
of impartiality. Thus the trinity of political
neutrality, anonymity and impartiality which
makes bureaucracy the useful machine it is gets
jeopardized under the influence of political
influence. So whether bureaucracy should be
made a totally autonomous institution free from
any political control? The answer is no, because
such an unanswerable disposition would
unleash the evil of absolutism sleeping within
the bureaucracy.
Thus another issue within the complicated
issue of minister-civil servant relationship is as
to how to preserve the proverbial neutrality,
anonymity and impartiality of the bureaucracy
while operating under the influence of the
political executive or how to keep the
bureaucracy efficient and effective despite the
wavering political environment in which it
functions.
The first step to examine the minister-civil
servant relationship is to identify the factors
which determine the nature of relationship
between minister and civil servant.
The conventional view of public
administration is based upon the dichotomy of
politics and administration i.e., administration
and politics should be kept separate. Politics or
policy making is the proper activity of the
legislative bodies and administration is the
proper activity of administrators who carry out
policies. It is opposed to any political role of the
civil servants. It visualizes the relationship
between the administrator and the politician in
terms of a neat division of labor – the politician
formulates the policy and the administrator
executes it. The bureaucrat acts as pure advisor
to his political master, presents facts of the case,
suggests lines of action and implications of
alternative policies. It is the prerogative of the
political master to decide the policy. The
bureaucrat is expected to implement the policy
faithfully, whatever the decision. He is to be
anonymous and neutral in the discharge of his
duty. He is expected to render impartial advice
without fear or favor. The doctrine of neutrality
and anonymity has been one of the fundamental
tenets of the Weberian bureaucracy.
The planners in India too subscribed to the
Weberian ideal of neutral civil service. An
impersonal, strictly rule-bound, neutral
bureaucracy was expected not only to provide
the necessary administrative objectivity but also enhance the democratic principle of equality and
provide protection from arbitrary rule by
adhering to the concept of neutrality. The
traditional concept of neutrality, however, has
been challenged on many grounds. The earlier
concept of separation of politics and
administration in watertight compartments is
considered no more valid. The role of the Civil
Service has been changing from being a mere
agent of the political executive to that of
collaboration with it. The involvement of
bureaucracy in political arena is now widely
prevalent
This breakdown of the theory of neutrality has
come about because of a number of reasons:
1. The processes of policy making are no
longer confined to the political executive.
The truth is that the bureaucrats play an
important role in policy formulation,
perceived to be the exclusive preserve of
elected politicians. This has happened
because the statutes passed by the
parliament are not clear enough. The
legislative behavior follows no consistent
pattern. Whereas, some measures are too
detailed, some only identify the problem. The
minister is rarely an expert in the work of
his department or the techniques of public
administration. He merely has general ideas
in line with the political ideology of his
party, but he often is not sure as to what is
the best solution to a particular problem. He
is therefore, forced to rely on his permanent
staff for facts and advice. In effect then, it is
the Administrator who has the major role
in framing the policy.
2. The decline of neutrality can be attributed
to the demands and pressures of coalition
politics. In coalition governments, ministers
are busy in the power game and
maneuvering for their survival, and have
neither time nor inclination to guide, direct
and control their department or
bureaucracy. Also at times, the legislative
process is so stormy and full of diverse
views that a statute passed incorporates a
number of contradictory policy guidelines.
The necessity of reaching a compromise
solution to hold the coalition together leads
the legislators to use vague language and
the administrator has to use his own
judgment to interpret the policy. Therefore,
bureaucracy has clearly made inroads in
policy making and despite the regulations
governing the civil servants they have been
politicized considerably.
3. According to some political commentators,
the classical theory of civil service neutrality
presupposes agreement on principles
fundamental to democracy. In other words,
neutral, value-free bureaucracy is possible
only in a society where consensus exists
on values; but in transitional societies like
India, where dissent and conflict exist; it is
too much to expect anyone to be neutral.
4. Especially for a developing country like
India where speedy socio-economic
development has to be steadily pushed
through, the nature and character of
bureaucracy assumes special significance.
The involvement of civil servants in
numerous decisions be it the location of a
steel plant or a school building in a village,
makes them partners in development along
with the politicians. Their value preferences
get inextricably mixed up with technical
advice. In the context of large-scale welfare
programs therefore, absolute neutrality is
not practically possible.
Thus the idea of committed bureaucracy
comes into picture which stands for a certain
commitment to the goals and objectives of the
state. Moreover, neutrality cannot be allowed to
degenerate into disinterestedness. The successful
carrying out of developmental tasks requires on
the part of administrators not only qualities of
initiative and leadership but also a sense of
emotional integration with the policies and
programs and identification with the interests
of the common man. Thus the idea of
bureaucracy as a neutral instrument in the
conduct of public affairs stood refuted as the
concept of politics-administration dichotomy.
The concept of ‘committed bureaucracy’ was
however much contested in the political and
administrative circles. It was alleged that it would
degenerate into what is called as ‘politicized
bureaucracy’ i.e., it would destroy the character
of the neutral bureaucracy and would create a
breed of pliable civil servants who would always
say “Yes Minister” and would be ready to crawl
when asked to bend by their political masters.
In practice however those fears of the critics have
come to life, commitment has indeed assumed
the perverted form of politicization and sycophancy. Very often it is seen that
bureaucracy simply acts according to the dictates
of the political executive without any
independent examination of issues.
This trend of excessive politicization of
bureaucracy can be attributed to the evergrowing
political interference in the affairs of
administration. Political interference and
committed/neutral administration cannot coexist.
While the administrators do not perceive
their role in policy making as subservient to the
political leaders because of their knowledge and
expertise, yet they have to conform to the
prerequisites of representative politics. The
political leaders claim to be the true
representatives of the people and thus claim to
know the values of the people. Because of their
superior position they succeed in dictating the
terms to the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats who
are not obliging enough soon find themselves in
trouble. The political masters have many means
of coercion–both overt and covert. Political
interference in all matters including those where
the statutory power is vested in the civil servants
is a constant phenomenon. There are numerous
instances of use of transfers, promotion,
supersession and compulsory retirement from
service by elected politicians as tools to silence
the voice of dissent and expression of difference
of opinion.
Moreover, politicization works the other way
round also. Many administrators use political
influence or forge alliance with the politician to
brighten their own career prospects. They take
advantage of the amateur politician; exploit his
weakness particularly in times of a fluid political
situation and turn out to be autonomous and
irresponsible. This is an equally grim scenario.
What emerges out of the analysis is that
whether there is collision or collusion between
the political executive and the bureaucracy, in
both cases it leads to organizational imbalance
and ultimately the governance suffers.
Commission’s Views
Expressing concern over the deteriorating
administrative standards, the government
appointed the Administrative Reforms
Commission (ARC) in 1966 to conduct a
comprehensive study of the administrative
system and suggest remedies. The two most
important areas touched upon by the ARC in its
reports were: (a) Minister – Civil ServantsChronicle IAS Academy [8]
relationship, wherein the ARC emphasized the
need for the de-politicization of the services, and
(b) the creation of a climate and culture of
administration that would help assert the
growth of healthy personal relationship between
Civil Servants and Minister. The ARC took
cognizance of the fact that proper relationship
between the political executive and bureaucracy
is a matter of highest importance to the
administrative performance of government. It
observed that the existing pattern of relationship
was different from what was envisaged. More
and more cases of deviation were coming to
notice. For instance the extent of bureaucratic
involvement in politics was exceptionally high,
there was frequent use of transfers and postings
to manipulate bureaucracy, there was unholy
nexus between politicians and bureaucracy, etc.
which was taking its toll on administrative
efficiency.
Therefore, corrective measures were required
to restore the health of the system.
The ARC stressed on the urgency to prevent
bureaucracy’s aggressive role in politics and also
on the need to check arbitrary interference of
politicians in administrative affairs. It believed
that both Minister and Civil Servants must
appreciate rather than belittle each others’ work
and attempt maximum accommodation of one
another’s views. On the part of the political
executive there should be, in the words of the
ARC,
A. Proper understanding of the administrative
functions and recognition of its
professional nature.
B. Little interference as possible in service
matters, e.g. postings, transfers, promotions,
etc.
C. No requests for departures from declared
and approved policies to suit individual
cases.
Similarly, on the part of the civil service it
asserts:
A. There must be a sincere and honest attempt
to find out what the political head wants
and make the necessary adjustment in
policies and procedures to suit his wishes.
B. Readiness to fall in line with his political
chief in all matters, unless strong grounds
indicate a different course.
In other words, it means an emotional and
mental acceptance by the bureaucracy of the ideology of the government policy to be executed
by it.
Despite the valuable recommendations made
by the ARC to streamline the relationship
between the minister and the civil servants,
nothing much seems to have changed because
of political and administrative apathy. Making
the matters worse is the growth in recent times
of a nexus between the politicians, criminals,
police and the civil servants rooted in the
considerations of “mutuality of benefit”. An
increasing use of money and muscle power by
political parties in winning elections is of
common knowledge. Since the muscle power is
mostly provided by the mafia and the criminals,
a close nexus prevails between the politicians
and the criminals resulting in “criminalization
of politics”. This has been the main conclusion
of the Vohra Committee Report of 1993
submitted by the then Home Secretary, Mr. N.N.
Vohra which was set up to look into the
criminalization of politics. The report observed
that the mafia and the criminals enjoyed the
patronage of politicians and the protection of
government functionaries. It pointed out how
the nexus was virtually running a parallel
government, pushing the state apparatus into
irrelevance. Here the two elites – political and
administrative, join hands and become not only
thick friends but also grand thieves. Such a nexus
is detrimental to public interest. Therefore, it was
felt that corrective steps must be taken to ensure
that this evil nexus is curbed.
With this objective in mind, the Prime
Minister inaugurated a Conference of Chief
Secretaries in November 1996 on ‘An Agenda
for an Effective and Responsive Administration.
The Conference emphasized the need for
bringing about transformation in public services
so as to make them more effective, clean,
accountable and citizen friendly. The Conference
also highlighted the necessity of adopting the
code of ethics for public services which not only
regulates the role of the civil servants but also
specifies the relationship between the employees
in public services and politicians, so that the basic
commitment of the civil servants towards the
welfare of the public and the principles
enshrined in the Constitution is reiterated.
Further, the 2nd ARC in its report on
Personnel administration emphasized on a need
to safeguard the political neutrality andChronicle IAS Academy [9]
impartiality of the civil services for which it
believes that the onus lies equally on the political
executive as well as the civil service
This aspect is recommended to be included
in the Code of Ethics for Ministers as well as the
Code of Conduct for Public Servants. Further the
Commission reiterated its recommendation
made in its Report on “Ethics in Governance”
while examining the definition of corruption
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
wherein it has been recommended that “abuse
of authority unduly favoring or harming
someone” and “obstruction of justice” should be
classified as an offence under the Act. This would
lead to the protection of honest and upright civil
servants against arbitrary political interference.
Moreover it also stressed upon the essentiality
to lay down certain norms for recruitment in
government to avoid complaints of favoritism,
nepotism, corruption and abuse of power. These
norms are:
i) Well defined procedure for recruitment
to all government jobs.
ii) Wide publicity and open competition for
recruitment to all posts.
iii) Minimization, if not elimination, of
discretion in the recruitment process.
iv) Selection primarily on the basis of
written examination or on the basis of
performance in existing public/board/
university examination with minimum
weight to interview.
These principles are envisaged in the new
Civil Services Bill which the commission has
suggested the government to bring.
Having said all this the real fruits of the efforts
can come only if the government implements
these recommendations which is in itself is an
issue of concern as any such move is interpreted
in the political circles as a move to dilute political
control over administration which is a taboo in
the political class of India. Further beyond the
limitations of organization and structures there
have been numerous instances of upright civil
servants driven by morals that have resisted all
the attempts of politicization and held their
ground defying fears of manipulation by
transfers, promotions, postings, etc. So
ultimately structures and statutes could only help
up to a limited extent and primarily it is the men
of conscience who could really help in bringing
good governance to the people.
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