Legislative control over administration implies
the control of parliament over the government as
officials cannot be directly held accountable to the
parliament owing to the principle of ministerial
responsibility and anonymity. Legislative control
over administration is exercised by means of
several tools like law making, question hour
(interpellations), zero hour, half an hour discussion,
short duration discussion, calling attention motion,
adjournment motion, no confidence motion,
censure motion, budgetary system, etc. Further
there are also means to exercise more specific
control through parliamentary committees like
Public Accounts Committee, Estimates committee,
Committee on Public Undertakings, Committee on
Subordinate Legislation, Committee on
Government Assurances, Departmental Standing
Committees, etc. Some are discussed below as:
Zero Hour: Unlike the Question Hour, the
Zero Hour is not mentioned in the rules of
procedure. Thus it is an informal device
available to the members of the parliament
to raise matters without any prior notice.
The Zero Hour starts immediately after the
Question Hour and lasts until the agenda
for the day (i.e., regular business of the
House) is taken up. In other words, the
time gap between the Question Hour and
the agenda is known as Zero Hour. It is
an Indian innovation in the field of
parliamentary procedures and has been in
existence since 1962.
Half-an-Hour Discussion: It is meant for
raising a discussion on a matter of
sufficient public importance which has
been subjected to a lot of debate and the
answer to which needs elucidation on a
matter of fact. The Speaker can allot three
days in a week for such discussions. There
is no formal motion or voting before the
House.
Short Duration Discussion: It is also
known as two hour discussion as the time
allotted for such a discussion should not
exceed two hours. The members of the
Parliament can raise such discussions on a
matter of urgent public importance. The
Speaker can allot two days in a week for
such discussions. There is neither a formal
motion before the house nor voting. This
device has been in existence since 1953
Other Discussions: In addition to the
above discussions, there are various other
occasions available to the members of
Parliament to raise discussions and debates
to examine and criticize the administration
for its lapses and failures. These include
the following:
a. Inaugural speech of the President (i.e.,
Motion of Thanks)
b. Introduction of several bills for enactment
of laws (i.e. debates on legislation)
c. Introduction and passing of resolutions on
matters of general public interest
Calling Attention: It is a notice introduced
in the Parliament by a member to call the
attention of a minister to a matter of urgent
public importance and to seek an
authoritative statement from him on that
matter. Like the Zero Hour, it is also an
Indian innovation in the parliamentary
procedure and has been in existence since
1954. However, unlike the Zero Hour, it is
mentioned in the rules of procedure.
Adjournment Motion: It is introduced in
the Parliament to draw attention of the
House to a matter of urgent public
importance. This motion needs the support
of 50 members to be admitted. As it
interrupts the normal business of the
House, it is regarded as an extraordinary
device. It involves an element of censure
against the government and hence Rajya
Sabha is not permitted to make use of this
device.
The discussion on an adjournment motion
should last for not less than two hours and thirty
minutes. The right to move a motion for an
adjournment of the business of the House is
subject to the following restrictions:
1. It should raise a matter which is definite,
factual urgent and of public importance;
2. It should not cover more than one matter;
3. It should be restricted to a specific matter
of recent occurrence and should not be
framed in general terms;
4. It should not raise a question of privilege;
5. It should not revive discussion on a matter
that has been discussed in the same session;
6. It should not deal with any matter that is
under adjudication by a court; and
7. It should not raise any question that can
be raised on a distinct motion
No Confidence Motion: Article 75 of the
Constitution states that the Council of
Ministers shall be collectively responsible
to the Lok Sabha. It means that the
ministry stays in office so long as it enjoys
confidence of the majority of the members
of the Lok Sabha. In other words, the Lok
Sabha can remove the ministry from office
by passing the No Confidence Motion. The
motion needs the support of 50 members
to be admitted.
Budgetary System: This is the most
important technique of parliamentary
control over administration. The Parliament
controls the revenues and expenditures of
the government through enactment of the
budget. It is the ultimate authority to
sanction the raising and spending of
government funds. It can criticize the
policies and actions of the government and
point out the lapses and failures of
administration during the process of
enactment of the budget.
Unless the Appropriation Bill and the
Finance Bill are passed, the executive cannot
incur expenditure and collect taxes respectively.
(For details see chapter on “Financial
Administration”)
Audit System: This is an important tool of
parliamentary control over administration.
The Comptroller and Auditor General of
India (CAG), on behalf of the Parliament,
audits the accounts of government and
submits an annual ‘Audit Report’ about
the financial transactions of the
government. The report of CAG highlights
the improper, illegal, unwise, uneconomical
and irregular expenditures of the
government. The CAG is an agent of the
Parliament and is responsible only to it (i.e.,
Parliament). Thus the financial
accountability of the government to the
Parliament is secured through the audit
Report of the CAG
Public Accounts Committee: This
committee was set up first in India in 1921
under the provisions of the Government of
India Act of 1919 and has since been in
existence. At present it consists of 22
members (15 from the Lok Sabha and 7
from the Rajya Sabha). The members are
elected by the Parliament every year from
amongst its members according to the
principle of proportional representation by
means of the single transferable vote. Thus,
all parties get due representation in it. The
term of office of the members is one year.
A minister cannot be elected as a member
of the Committee. The Chairman of the
Committee is appointed by the Speaker
from amongst its members. Until 1966-67,
the Chairman of the Committee belonged
to the ruling party. However, since then
(i.e., 1967) a convention has developed
whereby the Chairman of the committee
is selected invariably from the Opposition.
The function of the Committee is to examine
the annual audit reports of the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India (CAG) which are laid
before the Parliament by the President. In this
function the Committee is assisted by the CAG.
The CAG submits three audit reports to the
president, namely, audit report on appropriation
accounts, audit report on finance accounts and
audit report on public undertakings.
The committee examines public expenditure
not only from the legal and formal point of view
to discover technical irregularities but also from
the point of view of economy, prudence, wisdom
and propriety to bring out the cases of waste,
loss, corruption, extravagance, inefficiency and
nugatory expenses.
In more detail the functions of the committee
are:
1. To examine the appropriation accounts
and the finance accounts of the Union
government and any other accounts laid
before the Lok Sabha. The appropriation
accounts compare the actual expenditure
with the expenditure sanctioned by the
Parliament through the appropriation Act,
while the finance accounts show the
annual receipts and disbursements of the
Union Government.
2. In scrutinizing the appropriation accounts
and the audit report of CAG on it, the
Committee has to satisfy itself that:
(a) The money that has been disbursed was
legally available for the applied service or
purpose;
(b) The expenditure conforms to the authority
that governs it; and
(c) Every re-appropriation has been made in
accordance with the related rules.
3. To examine the accounts of state corporations,
trading concerns and
manufacturing projects and the audit
report of CAG on them (except those public
undertakings which are allotted to the
committee on public undertakings.)
4. To examine the accounts of autonomous
and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of
which is conducted by the CAG.
5. To consider the report of the CAG relating
to an audit of any receipt or to examine
the accounts of stores and stocks.
6. To examine the money spent on any
service during a financial year in excess of
the amount granted by the Lok Sabha for
that purpose.
On the role played by the Committee, Ashok
Chanda observed: “Over a period of years, the
Committee has entirely fulfilled the expectation
that it should develop into a powerful force in
the control of public expenditure. It may be
claimed that the traditions established and
conventions developed by the Public Accounts
Committee conform to the highest traditions of
a parliamentary democracy.”
the control of parliament over the government as
officials cannot be directly held accountable to the
parliament owing to the principle of ministerial
responsibility and anonymity. Legislative control
over administration is exercised by means of
several tools like law making, question hour
(interpellations), zero hour, half an hour discussion,
short duration discussion, calling attention motion,
adjournment motion, no confidence motion,
censure motion, budgetary system, etc. Further
there are also means to exercise more specific
control through parliamentary committees like
Public Accounts Committee, Estimates committee,
Committee on Public Undertakings, Committee on
Subordinate Legislation, Committee on
Government Assurances, Departmental Standing
Committees, etc. Some are discussed below as:
Zero Hour: Unlike the Question Hour, the
Zero Hour is not mentioned in the rules of
procedure. Thus it is an informal device
available to the members of the parliament
to raise matters without any prior notice.
The Zero Hour starts immediately after the
Question Hour and lasts until the agenda
for the day (i.e., regular business of the
House) is taken up. In other words, the
time gap between the Question Hour and
the agenda is known as Zero Hour. It is
an Indian innovation in the field of
parliamentary procedures and has been in
existence since 1962.
Half-an-Hour Discussion: It is meant for
raising a discussion on a matter of
sufficient public importance which has
been subjected to a lot of debate and the
answer to which needs elucidation on a
matter of fact. The Speaker can allot three
days in a week for such discussions. There
is no formal motion or voting before the
House.
Short Duration Discussion: It is also
known as two hour discussion as the time
allotted for such a discussion should not
exceed two hours. The members of the
Parliament can raise such discussions on a
matter of urgent public importance. The
Speaker can allot two days in a week for
such discussions. There is neither a formal
motion before the house nor voting. This
device has been in existence since 1953
Other Discussions: In addition to the
above discussions, there are various other
occasions available to the members of
Parliament to raise discussions and debates
to examine and criticize the administration
for its lapses and failures. These include
the following:
a. Inaugural speech of the President (i.e.,
Motion of Thanks)
b. Introduction of several bills for enactment
of laws (i.e. debates on legislation)
c. Introduction and passing of resolutions on
matters of general public interest
Calling Attention: It is a notice introduced
in the Parliament by a member to call the
attention of a minister to a matter of urgent
public importance and to seek an
authoritative statement from him on that
matter. Like the Zero Hour, it is also an
Indian innovation in the parliamentary
procedure and has been in existence since
1954. However, unlike the Zero Hour, it is
mentioned in the rules of procedure.
Adjournment Motion: It is introduced in
the Parliament to draw attention of the
House to a matter of urgent public
importance. This motion needs the support
of 50 members to be admitted. As it
interrupts the normal business of the
House, it is regarded as an extraordinary
device. It involves an element of censure
against the government and hence Rajya
Sabha is not permitted to make use of this
device.
The discussion on an adjournment motion
should last for not less than two hours and thirty
minutes. The right to move a motion for an
adjournment of the business of the House is
subject to the following restrictions:
1. It should raise a matter which is definite,
factual urgent and of public importance;
2. It should not cover more than one matter;
3. It should be restricted to a specific matter
of recent occurrence and should not be
framed in general terms;
4. It should not raise a question of privilege;
5. It should not revive discussion on a matter
that has been discussed in the same session;
6. It should not deal with any matter that is
under adjudication by a court; and
7. It should not raise any question that can
be raised on a distinct motion
No Confidence Motion: Article 75 of the
Constitution states that the Council of
Ministers shall be collectively responsible
to the Lok Sabha. It means that the
ministry stays in office so long as it enjoys
confidence of the majority of the members
of the Lok Sabha. In other words, the Lok
Sabha can remove the ministry from office
by passing the No Confidence Motion. The
motion needs the support of 50 members
to be admitted.
Budgetary System: This is the most
important technique of parliamentary
control over administration. The Parliament
controls the revenues and expenditures of
the government through enactment of the
budget. It is the ultimate authority to
sanction the raising and spending of
government funds. It can criticize the
policies and actions of the government and
point out the lapses and failures of
administration during the process of
enactment of the budget.
Unless the Appropriation Bill and the
Finance Bill are passed, the executive cannot
incur expenditure and collect taxes respectively.
(For details see chapter on “Financial
Administration”)
Audit System: This is an important tool of
parliamentary control over administration.
The Comptroller and Auditor General of
India (CAG), on behalf of the Parliament,
audits the accounts of government and
submits an annual ‘Audit Report’ about
the financial transactions of the
government. The report of CAG highlights
the improper, illegal, unwise, uneconomical
and irregular expenditures of the
government. The CAG is an agent of the
Parliament and is responsible only to it (i.e.,
Parliament). Thus the financial
accountability of the government to the
Parliament is secured through the audit
Report of the CAG
Public Accounts Committee: This
committee was set up first in India in 1921
under the provisions of the Government of
India Act of 1919 and has since been in
existence. At present it consists of 22
members (15 from the Lok Sabha and 7
from the Rajya Sabha). The members are
elected by the Parliament every year from
amongst its members according to the
principle of proportional representation by
means of the single transferable vote. Thus,
all parties get due representation in it. The
term of office of the members is one year.
A minister cannot be elected as a member
of the Committee. The Chairman of the
Committee is appointed by the Speaker
from amongst its members. Until 1966-67,
the Chairman of the Committee belonged
to the ruling party. However, since then
(i.e., 1967) a convention has developed
whereby the Chairman of the committee
is selected invariably from the Opposition.
The function of the Committee is to examine
the annual audit reports of the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India (CAG) which are laid
before the Parliament by the President. In this
function the Committee is assisted by the CAG.
The CAG submits three audit reports to the
president, namely, audit report on appropriation
accounts, audit report on finance accounts and
audit report on public undertakings.
The committee examines public expenditure
not only from the legal and formal point of view
to discover technical irregularities but also from
the point of view of economy, prudence, wisdom
and propriety to bring out the cases of waste,
loss, corruption, extravagance, inefficiency and
nugatory expenses.
In more detail the functions of the committee
are:
1. To examine the appropriation accounts
and the finance accounts of the Union
government and any other accounts laid
before the Lok Sabha. The appropriation
accounts compare the actual expenditure
with the expenditure sanctioned by the
Parliament through the appropriation Act,
while the finance accounts show the
annual receipts and disbursements of the
Union Government.
2. In scrutinizing the appropriation accounts
and the audit report of CAG on it, the
Committee has to satisfy itself that:
(a) The money that has been disbursed was
legally available for the applied service or
purpose;
(b) The expenditure conforms to the authority
that governs it; and
(c) Every re-appropriation has been made in
accordance with the related rules.
3. To examine the accounts of state corporations,
trading concerns and
manufacturing projects and the audit
report of CAG on them (except those public
undertakings which are allotted to the
committee on public undertakings.)
4. To examine the accounts of autonomous
and semi-autonomous bodies, the audit of
which is conducted by the CAG.
5. To consider the report of the CAG relating
to an audit of any receipt or to examine
the accounts of stores and stocks.
6. To examine the money spent on any
service during a financial year in excess of
the amount granted by the Lok Sabha for
that purpose.
On the role played by the Committee, Ashok
Chanda observed: “Over a period of years, the
Committee has entirely fulfilled the expectation
that it should develop into a powerful force in
the control of public expenditure. It may be
claimed that the traditions established and
conventions developed by the Public Accounts
Committee conform to the highest traditions of
a parliamentary democracy.”
However, the effectiveness of the role of the
Committee is limited by the following:
(a) It is not concerned with the questions of
policy in broader sense.
(b) It conducts a post-mortem examination of
accounts (showing the expenditure already
incurred).
(c) It cannot intervene in the matters of dayto-day
administration.
(d) Its recommendations are advisory and not
binding on the ministries.
(e) It is not vested with the power of
disallowance of expenditures by the
departments.
(f) It is not an executive body and hence,
cannot issue an order. Only the Parliament
can take a final decision on its findings.
Estimates Committee: The origins of this
committee can be traced to the Standing Financial
Committee setup in 1921. The first Estimates
Committee in the post-independence era was
constituted in 1950 on the recommendation ofChronicle IAS Academy [12]
John Marhai, the then Finance Minister.
Originally, it had 25 members but in 1956 its
membership was raised to 30. All the thirty
members are from Lok Sabha only. The Rajya
Sabha has no representation in this Committee.
These members are elected by the Lok Sabha
every year from amongst its members, according
to the principles of proportional representation
by means of a single transferable vote. Thus, all
parties get due representation in it. The term of
office is one year. A minister cannot be elected
as a member of the Committee. The Chairman
of the Committee is appointed by the Speaker
from amongst its members. The Chairman of the
Committee is invariably from the ruling party.
The function of the Committee is to examine
the estimates included in the budget and suggest
‘economies’ in public expenditure. Hence, it has
been described as a ‘continuous economy
committee.’
In more detail, the functions of the Committee
are:
(a) To report what economics, improvements
in organization, efficiency and administrative
reforms consistent with the policy underlying
the estimates may be affected.
(b) To suggest alternative policies in order to
bring about efficiency and economy in
administration.
(c) To examine whether the money is well laid
out within the limits of the policy implied
in the estimates.
(d) To suggest the form in which the estimates
shall be presented to Parliament:
The Committee shall not exercise its functions
in relation to such public undertakings as are
allotted to the Committee on Public
Undertakings.
The Committee may continue the
examination of the estimates from time to time,
throughout the financial year and report to the
House as its examination proceeds. It shall not
be incumbent on the Committee to examine the
entire estimates of any one year. The demands
for grants may be finally voted despite the fact
that the Committee has made no report.
However, the effectiveness of the role of the
committee is limited by the following:
(i) It examines the budget estimates only
after they have been voted by the
Parliament, and not before that.
(ii) It cannot question the policy laid down
by the Parliament.
(iii) Its recommendations are advisory and
not binding on the ministries.
(iv) It examines every year only certain
selected ministries and departments.
Thus, by rotation, it would cover all of
them over a number of years.
(v) It lacks the expert assistance of the CAG
which is available to the Public Accounts
Committee.
(vi) Its work is in the nature of a postmortem
Committee on Public Undertakings: This
Committee was created in 1964 on the
recommendation of the Krishna Menon
Committee. Originally, it had 15 members
(10 from the Lok Sabha and 5 from the
Rajya Sabha). But in 1974, its membership
was raised to 22 (15 from the Lok Sabha
and 7 from the Rajya Sabha). The members
are elected by the Parliament every year
from amongst its members according to the
principle of proportional representation by
means of a single transferable vote. Thus,
all parties get due representation in it. The
term of office of the members is one year.
A minister cannot be elected as a member
of the Committee. The Chairman of the
Committee is appointed by the Speaker
from amongst its members who are drawn
from the Lok Sabha only. Thus, the
members of the Committee who are from
the Rajya Sabha cannot be appointed as
the Chairman
The functions of the Committee are:
(a) To examine the reports and accounts of
public undertakings.
(b) To examine the reports, if any, of the
Comptroller and Auditor-General on public
undertakings.
(c) To examine, in the context of autonomy
and efficiency of public undertakings,
whether the affairs of the public
undertakings are being managed in
accordance with sound business principles
and prudent commercial practices.
(d) To exercise such other functions vested in
the Committee on Public Accounts and the
Committee on Estimates in relation toChronicle IAS Academy [13]
public undertakings as may be allotted to
the Committee by the Speaker from time
to time.
The Committee shall not examine and
investigate any of the following:
(i) Matters of major government policy as
distinct from business or commercial
functions of the Public undertakings.
(ii) Matters of day-to-day administration.
(iii) Matters for the consideration of which
machinery is established by any special
statute under which a particular public
undertaking is established.
Further, the effectiveness of the role of the
Committee is limited by the following:
(a) It cannot take up the examination of more
than ten to twelve public undertakings in
a year.
(b) Its work is in the nature of a post-mortem.
(c) It does not look into technical matters as
its members are not technical experts.
(d) Its recommendations are advisory and not
binding on the ministries.
Committee on Subordinate Legislation:
This Committee was constituted in 1953.
It consists of 15 members including the
Chairman, who are nominated by the
Speaker. The term of office of the members
is one year. A minister cannot be
nominated as a member of the Committee.
The Chairman of the Committee is drawn
from the Opposition.
The function of the Committee is to examine
and report to the Lok Sabha, whether the powers
to make regulations rules sub-rules, by-laws and
others, conferred by the Constitution or
delegated by the Parliament to the executive, are
being properly exercised by it. Each regulation,
rule, sub-rule, by-law and others, is technically
known as ‘Order’. After each such order is laid
before the Lok Sabha, the Committee shall
consider.
(i) Whether it is in accord with the general
objects of the Constitution or the act
pursuant to which it is made.
(ii) Whether it contains matter, which in
the opinion of the committee, should
more properly be dealt within an act of
parliament.
(iii) Whether it contains imposition of any
tax.
(iv) Whether it directly or indirectly bars the
jurisdiction of the courts.
(v) Whether it gives retrospective effect to
any of the provisions in respect of which
the Constitution or the act does not
expressly give any such power.
(vi) Whether it involves expenditure from
the Consolidated Fund of India or the
public revenues.
(vii) Whether it appears to make some
unusual or unexpected use of the
powers conferred by the Constitution or
the act pursuant to which it is made.
(viii) Whether there appears to have been
unjustifiable delay in its publication or
in laying it before the parliament.
(ix) Whether for any reason its form or
purport calls for any elucidation.
Committee on Government Assurances:
This Committee was constituted in 1953.
It consists of 15 members including the
Chairman, who are nominated by the
speaker. The term of office of members is
one year. A minister cannot be nominated
as a member of the Committee.
The function of the Committee is to examine
the assurances, promises, undertakings, and so
on, given by ministers from time to time on the
floor of the Lok Sabha, and to report on:
(a) The extent to which such assurances,
promises, undertakings have been
implemented.
(b) Whether such implementation has taken
place within the minimum time necessary
for the purpose.
Departmental Standing Committees: There
are 24 Departmentally Related Standing
Committees covering under their jurisdiction
all the Ministries/Departments of the
Government of India. Each of these
Committees consists of 31 Members - 21
from Lok Sabha and 10 from Rajya Sabha
to be nominated by the Speaker, Lok Sabha
and the Chairman, Rajya Sabha,
respectively. Provided that a member
appointed as a Minister, shall not be
nominated as, or continue as, a member of
any Committee. The term of Office of these
Committees does not exceed one year.
A full-fledged system of 17 Departmentally
Related Standing Committees came into beingChronicle IAS Academy [14]
in April, 1993. Some examples: Committee on
Commerce; Committee on Home Affairs;
Committee on Human Resource Development,
etc.
Till 13th Lok Sabha, each Standing Committee
consisted of not more than 45 members 30 to be
nominated by the Speaker from amongst the
members of Lok Sabha and 15 to be nominated
by the Chairman, Rajya Sabha from amongst the
members of Rajya Sabha. However, with
restructuring of DRSCs in July, 2004 each DRSC
consists of 31 Members - 21 from Lok Sabha and
10 from Rajya Sabha.
With reference to the Ministries/Departments
under their purview, the functions of these
Standing Committees are:-
a) to consider the Demands for Grants of the
related Ministries/Departments and report
thereon. The report shall not suggest
anything of the nature of cut motions;
b) to examine Bills, pertaining to the related
Ministries/Departments, referred to the
Committee by the Chairman or the
Speaker, as the case may be, and report
thereon;
c) to consider the annual reports of the
Ministries/Departments and report
thereon; and
d) to consider national basic long term policy
documents presented to the Houses, if
referred to the Committee by the Chairman
or the Speaker, as the case may be, and
report thereon:
The Standing Committees does not consider
matters of day-to-day administration of the
related Ministries/Departments and the
recommendations of these committees are
advisory in nature and hence, not binding on
Parliament.
The following procedure shall be followed
by each of the Standing Committees in its
consideration of the Demands for Grants and
making a report thereon to the Houses, after the
general discussion on the Budget in the Houses
is over, and the Houses are adjourned for a fixed
period:-
a) the Committee shall consider the Demands
for Grants of the related Ministries during
the aforesaid period;
b) the Committee shall make its report within
the specified period;
c) There shall be a separate report on the
Demands for Grants of each Ministry;
d) The demand for grants shall be considered
by the House with respect to the reports of
the Standing Committee.
The following procedure shall be followed
by each of the Standing Committees in examining
a Bill and making a report thereon:-
a) the Committee shall examine only such
Bills introduced in either of the Houses as
are referred to it by the Chairman or the
Speaker, as the case may be; and
b) the Committee shall consider the general
principles and clauses of such Bills and
shall make report thereon within such time
as may be specified by the Chairman or
the Speaker, as the case may be.
The Departmentally Related Standing
Committee System is a path-breaking endeavour
of the Parliamentary surveillance over
administration. With the emphasis of their
functioning to concentrate on long-term plans,
policies guiding the working of the Executive,
these Committees provide necessary direction,
guidance and inputs for broad policy
formulations and in achievement of the longterm
national perspective by the Executive.
The merits of the standing committee system
in the Parliament are:-
(i) Their proceedings are devoid of any party
bias.
(ii) The procedure adopted by them is more
flexible than in the Lok Sabha.
(iii) The system makes parliamentary control
over executive much more detailed, close,
continuous, in-depth and comprehensive.
(iv) The system ensures economy and efficiency
in public expenditure as the ministries/
Departments would now be more careful
in formulating their demands.
(v) They facilitate opportunities to all the
members of Parliament to participate and
understand the functioning of the
government and contribute to it.
(vi) They can avail of expert opinion or public
opinion to make the reports. They are
authorized to invite experts and eminent
persons to testify before them and
incorporate their opinions in their reports.
(vii)The opposition parties and the Rajya
Sabha can now play a greater role in
exercising financial control over the
executive.
However the major issue in this section is the
limitations and ineffectiveness of various tools
of legislative control. This issue however pans
out to the argument as to whether the legislature
is able to exercise effective control over the
executive or not.
The legislative control over administration
in parliamentary countries like India is more
theoretical than practical. In realty, the control
is not as effective as it ought to be. The legislative
control over the government in India could not
be termed as strong and there are various reasons
for it. The first and foremost is the nature of our
parliamentary form of government wherein the
council of ministers is drawn out from the group
that holds the majority in the parliament.
Moreover all the decisions in a parliamentary
form of government are taken by the majority
therefore as long as the council of ministers
enjoys the support of the majority there is hardly
anything substantial that the parliament could
do to control the executive. Further there are
other reasons which come into picture as per
situation and settings viz.
1. In India the size of administration has
grown so large in terms of volume of work
and complexity that the parliament has
neither the time nor the expertise to control
the administration.
2. The technical nature of some issues like
the financial grants is beyond the full and
proper understanding of the laymen
parliamentarians. Further the increased
recourse to ‘Guillotine’ has reduced the
scope of financial control.
3. The increased importance of ‘delegated
legislation’ has further reduced the powers
of the parliament in making the details of
the law. This has in fact increased the
powers of the bureaucracy which is now,
more free to hide the devil in the details.
4. The frequent disruptions in the working
of the parliament due to political reasons
or other reasons by the opposition or
otherwise further compress the limited time
available to the parliament for functions
of scrutiny and control of the acts of the
executive.
5. The frequent promulgation of ordinances
by the President further dilutes the powers of the parliament in legislation and
scrutiny.
6. The most concerning reason however is
the extensive limitations imposed on the
role and functioning of the parliamentary
committees which have been reduced to
an eyewash due to the following reasons:
a) They are only made to make a post
mortem analysis of the work, which
makes the preventive aspect of control
over the executive difficult.
b) They are not allowed to question the
policy decisions of the government.
c) It can hardly look into the technical
matters as its matters are drawn from
the members of the parliament who
hardly have any understanding of
technical matters.
d) Their recommendations are of advisory
nature and are not binding on the
parliament.
Thus the parliamentary committees end up
with hardly any ground to make meaningful
contribution to the process of legislative control.
However this opinion is not acceptable to
Paul. H. Appleby who is still very critical to the
parliamentary control in India. He writes that
the members of parliament greatly exaggerate
the importance of the report of the CAG. This in
turn increases timidity of public servants at all
levels, making them unwilling to take initiatives
and for actions and subsequently unwilling to
take responsibility of their decisions, forcing
decisions to be made by a slow and cumbersome
process of reference and conference in which
everybody finally shares some part of
responsibility of making the decision, not enough
gets done and what gets done is done too slowly.
Moreover the parliament seems strangely
inclined to make too ready concessions to some
of the self interest demands of some pressure
groups from the business community and other
areas and enforce corresponding changes in
government’s decisions. Further the parliament’s
endorsement of the formerly small and narrow
approach of the public service commission to its
own functions in the mistaken belief that this
strengthens the merit system, undermines the
responsibility of the ministries and thereby,
undermines the responsibility of the parliament.
Finally he targets the apprehensions of the
parliamentarians behind their reluctance to
delegate their powers of detail. This creates a
possessive culture right down the hierarchy from
ministers to secretaries to managing directors to
others, thus creating too much control which
actually becomes ineffective and stagnated due
to this inhibitionists mindset, defeating its very
purpose.
Further more in present context the role of
coalition politics also increases the degree of
legislative control over administration. We have
seen several times in the past that when the
ruling party is dependent on some other party
for majority in the Parliament, it becomes more
responsive at least in the sense that it is found to
become more sensitive to the concerns indicated
by the coalition partner, however this increased
efficacy seems to be working other ways when
any member from the coalition partner is alleged
to be involved in some irregularities. In such
cases the same coalition constraints which had
increased the degree of legislative control is found
to demolish the norms of legislative control and
the administration/executive/government starts
protecting the partner defying all the legislative
norms.
Another factor which seems to work in favor
of increasing the degree of legislative control
over the administration in the present times is
the increased role of the media. Mass media in
India has grown and developed very rapidly in
India especially in the past decade. The growth
of 24x7 news channels and the increased
penetration of satellite television in the country
has vested great powers in the media to create
public opinion. The media keeps the people and
the leaders informed about the activities of the
government continuously. The MPs have been
found to use media reports frequently in the
debates of the parliament. Several sting
operations have exposed not only the people in
the government but also people in the exclusive
public domain and have forced them to answer
and explain their actions. However if we are to
quantify the achievements of the media the only
major effect it can produce is in the creation of a
public opinion in case of any gross violation of
the constitution or public interest by the
government, which could have any impact at
the time of elections.
Thus it is difficult to say conclusively as to
whether the legislature is able to exercise
optimum levels of control over the executive.
However there is much which the legislature could do particularly by its powers of framing
new laws and regulations. For example the
second ARC has recommended a Code of Ethics
for Civil Servants under which:
A. A set of ‘Public Service Values’ towards
which all public servants should aspire,
should be defined and made applicable to
all tiers of Government and para Government
organizations. Any transgression of these
values should be treated as misconduct,
inviting punishment.
B. A code of Ethics for Regulators in form of
a comprehensive and enforceable code of
conduct should be prescribed for all
professions with statutory backing.
C. An ethical Framework for Ministers. In
addition to the existing Code of Conduct
for Ministers, there should be a Code of
Ethics to provide guidance on how
Ministers should uphold the highest
standards of constitutional and ethical
conduct in the performance of their duties.
D. Dedicated units should be set up in the
offices of the Prime Minister and the Chief
Ministers to monitor the observance of the
Code of Ethics and the Code of Conduct.
The unit should also be empowered to
receive public complaints regarding
violation of the Code of Conduct.
E. The Prime Minister or the Chief Minister
should be duty bound to ensure the
observance of the Code of Ethics and the
Code of Conduct by Ministers. This would
be applicable even in the case of coalition
governments where the Ministers may
belong to different parties.
F. An annual report with regard to the
observance of these Codes should be
submitted to the appropriate legislature.
This report should include specific cases of
violations, if any, and the action taken
thereon.
G. The Code of Ethics, the Code of Conduct
and the annual report should be put in
the public domain.
Apart from these, there are other very
important recommendations related to the
Lokpal/Lokayukta, revision of the constitutional
protection available to the civil servants under
Article 311, review of the definition of office of
profit, recasting of the Benami Transactions act
and the Anti Corruption act, etc. If parliament
could bring effective and meaningful legislations
on these vital matters concerning the role and
the functioning of the executive, it will go very
far in strengthening accountability and control
of the executive and thus ensuring good
governance.
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